On 29 October 2024, torrential rains overwhelmed towns across the Valencian Community, submerging streets, homes and businesses under metres of water. The flash floods killed 229 people and caused billions in damage, marking the region's worst natural disaster of the century.
The storm, known as a DANA (Isolated High-Level Depression), dumped record-breaking rainfall — over 770 litres per square metre in 24 hours in the town of Turís — and sent rivers like the Rambla del Poyo surging beyond their limits. Streets became rivers, infrastructure buckled, and entire neighbourhoods were swept away.
Twelve months later, experts warn that despite some progress, many of the structural weaknesses exposed by the tragedy remain unresolved.
A perfect storm of nature and neglect
Professor Víctor Yepes Piqueras, a civil engineer at the Polytechnic University of Valencia, says the disaster was the result of both natural extremes and human shortcomings.
"From an engineering standpoint, the October 29 floods were an extraordinary event — extreme rainfall far beyond any design expectation," he told Euronews. "In Turís, 771.8 litres per square metre fell in a single day, and the Rambla del Poyo reached flows exceeding 2,200 cubic metres per second before sensors were destroyed. It proves that zero risk simply doesn't exist."
Yepes says the lack of timely investment in flood control systems was decisive. "Defence projects had been studied and planned for years, but they were never executed in time," he said.
Some infrastructure, like the Nuevo Cauce del Turia and the Forata and Buseo dams, functioned effectively and protected parts of Valencia city. But elsewhere, inadequate planning and drainage worsened the devastation.
Hydraulic engineering professor Félix Francés, also from the Polytechnic University, agrees that the region had forecasting tools — but they failed when it mattered most.
"There were protocols, automatic hydrological data systems, and civil protection plans," he said. "But when the moment came, they didn't work as expected."
He notes that Spain's meteorological agency, Aemet, still lacks "nowcasting" capabilities — ultra-short-term forecasts used in other countries — and that the regional flood monitoring network, known as SAIH, could only show real-time sensor data. "Beyond what the sensors saw, we were blind," Francés said.
Delayed warnings, poor coordination
For Francés, the greatest failure lay in emergency management.
"Sending out alerts an hour and a half after the flooding started — as if it weren't serious — is unacceptable," he said. "People were receiving warnings while already climbing trees to escape the water. There's huge room for improvement."
He also pointed to a lack of coordination between local governments and a general absence of public training. "There was no education, no preparation. People didn't know what to do," he said.
Yepes adds that decades of unplanned urban growth left many towns exposed. "The DANA revealed a deep urban planning crisis," he said.
"The most vulnerable areas lie on the L'Horta Sud floodplain, which was heavily urbanised between the 1950s and 1970s without proper drainage or risk zoning. Development interests were allowed to override sensible land-use restrictions — increasing the region's vulnerability."
Slow progress, unfinished business
Over the past year, authorities have made some progress — but far too slowly, experts say.
"Things are moving forward, but Spanish bureaucracy is notoriously slow," Francés noted. He said work is underway to update management plans and hydrological forecasting systems dating back to 2006. Civil protection alerts have improved, and education initiatives are now being rolled out in schools.
Yepes acknowledges that emergency repairs and reinforcements were carried out on critical infrastructure such as the Forata and Buseo dams and the Júcar-Turia canal, while drainage was improved in towns like Paiporta. The regional government also approved Decree-Law 20/2024, setting new urban planning guidelines.
But he warns that "basic planning legislation remains largely unchanged" and that "key flood-control dams are still just on paper."
Preventing the next disaster
Both experts agree that to reduce future risk, Spain must strengthen forecasting, education and infrastructure simultaneously.
Francés believes education and communication are the first line of defence. "We must improve every link in the chain — from meteorological alerts and hydrological forecasts to public awareness and local emergency plans," he said.
Yepes argues that the physical landscape must also change. "We need to accelerate flood-control works, rebuild transport networks with resilience in mind, and give space back to rivers," he said. "Critical infrastructure should be relocated out of flood-prone zones as part of a long-term plan."
"We are still unprepared"
Both scientists agree that extreme weather will continue to be a defining feature of the Mediterranean climate. "Since 1951, there have been four events even more intense than 2024," Francés warned. "These phenomena can recur anywhere along the Mediterranean arc."
Yepes's final assessment is stark. "We remain as vulnerable as before. We are not prepared to face another DANA like the one in 2024," he said.
He likened the situation to "a family driving at 120 km/h without seat belts — one unexpected obstacle could be fatal."
"Acknowledging the loss and rebuilding without real protection measures," he added, "means accepting that the same tragedy will happen again. And that is unacceptable."